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A wide range of heterodox theories claim that banks are special because they create 
money in the act of lending. Put another way, banks can create the funding they need ex 
nihilo, whereas all other agencies must first acquire the funding they need from other 
parties. Mainstream economic theory largely agrees with this assessment, but questions 
its theoretical and empirical relevance, preferring to view banks as one of many 
potentially important actors in the financial market. In this paper, I develop a formal 
economic model in an attempt to make these ideas precise. The model lends some 
support to both views on banking. Empty 10 
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1   Introduction 
While mainstream macroeconomic models today are more attentive to the workings of the 
financial market, they mostly ignore the fact that bank deposit liabilities constitute money and 
that the broad money supply is largely determined by the lending practices of the bank sector. 
Given that these mainstream models purportedly help inform central bank policy, and given 
the prominent role that banks often play in financial crises, is this omission a mistake? A 
chorus of heterodox voices in macroeconomics are adamant that it is. This paper constitutes 
an attempt to evaluate their claim. 
Let me review briefly, to the best of my ability, the key elements of two broad schools of 
thought on the matter. The mainstream view is that modeling the operational details of 
banking–the financing of assets with deposit liabilities–can be safely ignored for questions 
related to the business cycle. According to this view, the degree of liquidity associated with 
liabilities issued by the private sector lies on a continuum, so it makes little sense to draw a 
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sharp distinction between which of these liabilities constitute “money” and which do not 
(Tobin, 1963). Banks are just one of many actors in the market for loanable funds. 
Admittedly, they may play an important role in the cycle, but only to the extent that they 
constitute highly-levered entities (Krugman, 2012a, 2012b). The fact that bank lending 
creates money–i.e., that bank liabilities are more liquid than those of other financial agencies–
is not a critical consideration. In any case, central bank policy, whether through reserve 
management or interest rate policy, ultimately controls the total (central and commercial) 
money supply (Rowe, 2012a). 
The heterodox view is that banks are critically different from other financial market 
participants. In particular, while non-bank agencies wanting to finance investments first need 
to acquire the requisite funding, this is not the case for banks. In contrast to the non-bank 
sector, banks can create the money they lend. Consolidating the banking sector with other 
actors in a market for loanable funds stems from the misguided notion that banks lend out 
reserves that they must first acquire. Banks do not in fact lend reserves–they lend their deposit 
liabilities (which are incidentally made redeemable for cash). While banks make use of 
reserves for settlement purposes, reserves do not constrain bank lending (Fullwiler, 2012).1 
First, central banks typically supply the reserves demanded by the banking sector. Second, 
even with a limited supply of reserves, the banking sector possesses a wide latitude in 
determining the money supply. This is important because it implies that the macroeconomic 
impact of bank-financed investment is quantitatively more significant than market-financed 
investment. A hedge fund, for example, must first acquire the money it needs to fund an 
investment. The money it acquires reduces the spending power of those who have released it.2 
Because a bank does not require an outside source of funds, bank-financed investments have a 
greater impact on aggregate demand. Autonomous changes in bank-lending standards can 
therefore have an outsized effect on aggregate demand (Mason, 2012). A failure to understand 
the special nature of banking can lead to ill-designed financial market regulations that 
promote undiagnosed/undesirable credit market booms and crashes (Pettifor, 2014). 
Sorting through the substantive differences in these two views and why it matters is not an 
easy task. You can judge for yourself by wading through a debate on the subject that surfaced 
not too long ago on the blogosphere when the mainstream Krugman (2012a, 2012b) replied to 
                                                 
1 Fullwiler (2012) argues that banks are not constrained by reserves when the central bank targets an 
interest rate. This is true, but it only implies that the central bank is fully accommodating the demand 
for reserves in this case. Interest rate policy still affects the opportunity cost of lending. See also Rowe 
(2012a). 
2 It is generally agreed that the reallocation of purchasing power from savers to borrowers can have 
consequences for aggregate demand to the extent that savers and borrowers have (say) different 
propensities to consume. The heterodox view appears to consider such effects of second-order 
importance. 
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an opening salvo from the heterodox Keen (2012). The discussion that ensued did not lead to 
a satisfactory conclusion.3 I am sympathetic to the observation made by Krugman (2012a): 
My point is that there seems to be a lot of implicit theorizing going on here 
— and at least at first glance, the implicit theorizing doesn’t make a lot of 
sense. I could be wrong, but that’s the whole point of simple models: to lay 
bare what you’re assuming, and make it clear what, specifically, is driving 
your conclusions. 
The purpose of this paper is make the theory more explicit. The model I develop below 
delivers conclusions that are consistent with either view depending on the parameter values 
describing the economic environment. The model therefore provides a way to identify which 
assumptions are critical to delivering the results favored by proponents of each view. 
The framework I propose to use to help us organize our thinking on this matter is a simple 
overlapping generations model. At any given point in time, the population is divided into two 
age cohorts: “young” and “old.” There is heterogeneity within age cohorts as well. The young 
consist of “workers” (savers) and “investors” (borrowers). Naturally, this implies that the old 
will be characterized by their respective trading histories. Old savers will have accumulated 
financial wealth. Old investors will have accumulated financial obligations, which they honor 
from the proceeds of their maturing investments. 
The analysis proceeds in stages. To begin, I study the outcome associated with a well-
functioning market for private debt. In this economy, young investors borrow young labor to 
construct new capital goods, which produce a future output that can be divided between 
investor and creditor. Young labor is paid with private IOUs representing direct claims 
against future inventory. This action takes place on the proverbial “loanable funds 
market” that matches savers with borrowers. 
Next, I introduce a fixed supply of nominal interest-bearing government debt, where the 
interest-expense is financed through taxes. I view the debt as being held entirely as an asset in 
a narrow bank, so that money takes the form of interest-bearing deposit liabilities issued by 
the banking sector. Workers can now allocate their labor to the services sector (producing 
consumption for the old in exchange for money) or, as before, to the capital goods sector 
(producing capital goods for young investors in exchange for private debt). The nominal 
interest rate is determined by a Taylor rule. A parameter in the Taylor rule dictates the 
prevailing real rate of interest, which determines investment demand and the demand for real 
money balances. 
I then impose a credit-market friction that limits how much funding investors can obtain 
from the market for loanable funds. For simplicity, I consider the extreme case where no 
                                                 
3 Though some welcome clarity was provided by Rowe (2012b), Waldman (2012), Koning (2013) and 
Roche (2013). 
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credit is granted. In this economy, investment collapses as all savings are diverted to money 
(government debt). The price-level deflates. The only possible winners in this scenario are 
those holding the nominal debt during the deflation. To an econometrician, what transpires 
looks very much like a collapse in aggregate demand. Desired saving in the form of private 
debt does not match investment demand at the prevailing real rate of interest. 
Finally, I permit the banking system to hold assets other than government debt. I make the 
following critical assumption: the liabilities issued by banks are more credible than those 
issued by private investors.4 With this power, banks can create and lend money to investors in 
exchange for their illiquid collateral. In the model, banks are unconstrained by reserves in the 
act of creating money (though the policy interest rate ultimately dictates loan demand and 
hence the size of the banking sector’s balance sheet). The added supply of bank money 
stimulates real economic activity because it relaxes borrowing constraints. Exogenous 
variation in the ability/willingness of the banking sector to finance investment generates a 
business cycle with a procyclical price-level. The price-level rises in a boom not because of 
an expanding broad money supply, but because additional bank lending stimulates 
investment, which leads to a decline in the demand for real money balances through a 
portfolio substitution effect. The long-run rate of inflation is determined by the growth rate of 
the supply of outside money relative to the growth rate of money demand (in the model, both 
are normalized to zero). 
What to make of all this? In the model, banks and financial markets are competing 
mechanisms for allocating credit. Banks are “special” only to the extent they are better than 
markets at funding investment. This specialness is not (in the model) logically rooted in their 
ability to create money. In particular, bond-finance in the model is “special” if it is the lower 
cost way to fund investment. Variations in the parameter that governs the willingness/ability 
of non-bank creditors to extend credit generates business cycles in the exact same way it 
would in a banking economy. 
Because bank-finance coexists with other forms of financing, it is not entirely clear why 
monetary/fiscal policies should make special consideration of the banking sector per se.5 The 
fact that commercial banks create liabilities that are used widely in payments is not likely a 
first-order concern. We saw in the financial crisis of 2008, in particular, how highly-leveraged 
shadow banks were perfectly capable of disrupting the financial market without the capacity 
to create money. 6  A case can be made that the ingredient missing from conventional 
                                                 
4 In general, we can think of this being true for a subset of the population and the opposite being true 
for others, implying the coexistence of bank deposits with other forms of financing. 
5 The matter is different for policymakers in charge of regulatory design since in this case institutional 
details clearly matter. 
6 In the context of the present discussion it is somewhat ironic to note that these non-bank entities 
behaved in the way traditional textbooks describe conventional banks as lending out reserves. Instead 
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macroeconomic models was leverage in general, not banking in particular. This is the sense in 
which the analysis below, while sympathetic to the heterodox perspective, largely ends up 
supporting the mainstream view. 
2 The environment 
Let us consider an overlapping generations model.7 At each date 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , ∞, 2𝑁 young 
individuals enter the economy. The young live (have a planning horizon over) two periods. At 
the end of the second period of their planning horizon, the young exit the economy. At date 
𝑡 = 1, there are 2𝑁 old individuals (the initial old) who are the only ones in the economy with 
a planning horizon of one period. 
The population of young individuals is divided evenly between workers and investors, so 
that there is a mass 𝑁 of each type. In what follows, I make the harmless normalization 
𝑁 = 1. Workers are endowed with 𝑦௧ units of output when young that can take the form of 
consumption or investment. 8  Investors are endowed with an investment project that 
transforms 𝑘 units of output at date 𝑡 into 𝑥𝑓(𝑘) units of output at date 𝑡 + 1. Assume that 
𝑓ᇱᇱ < 0 < 𝑓ᇱ with 𝑓(0) = 0 and the standard Inada conditions. The parameter 𝑥 indexes the 
expected productivity of capital spending. 9  Assume 𝑓ᇱ(𝑘)𝑘 = 𝛼𝑓(𝑘),  where 0 < 𝛼 < 1 
indexes the importance of capital in production (vis-à-vis the implicit fixed factor).10 
An individual who enters the economy at date 𝑡 = 0,1,2, . . . , ∞ has preferences given by 
𝑈௧ = 𝑐௧ାଵ. That is, all individuals are assumed to care only for consumption in the second 
period of life. Moreover, individuals are risk-neutral. Note that at any given point in time 
𝑡 > 1,  the economy is populated by four types of individuals: young workers, young 
investors, old workers, and old investors–this is not a representative agent economy! 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
of reserves, entities like Lehman Brothers lent out (rehypothecated) U.S. Treasuries to finance higher 
yielding tranches of purportedly safe mortgage-backed securities. 
7 I hope that readers not familiar with the OLG model will not be put off too much by the level of 
abstraction. Where certain assumptions are deemed excessively unpalatable, keep in mind that we can 
return later and add the pieces we feel are missing and check the robustness of our conclusions. 
8 Alternatively, think of the young as being endowed with a unit of labor that can be transformed into 𝑦௧ 
units of output. Labor employed in the consumption sector produces consumer goods. Labor 
employed in the investment sector produces new capital goods. 
9 Nothing in the analysis below requires expectations to be “rational.” All that is important 
here is that individuals are forward-looking. 
10 That is, each investor is assumed to possess 𝑒 units of “entrepreneurial effort” and an investment 
technology 𝐹(𝑘, 𝑒)  where 𝐹  is standard neoclassical. Normalize the fixed factor 𝑒 = 1  and define 
𝑓(𝑘) ≡ 𝐹(𝑘, 1). 
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2.1 A market for loanable funds 
The gains to trade in this economy are self-evident: young investors want young labor in 
exchange for future consumption. There are a variety of ways in which we can think of these 
individuals trading. Here, I choose to model exchange as occurring in a centralized location 
where all are free to bid for the goods and services they desire and where the terms of trade 
are ultimately determined by “supply and demand” in a competitive market.11 One could 
alternatively have modeled exchange as a decentralized market where savers and borrowers 
meet bilaterally or through a broker; see, for example, Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2009). 
The economy can be thought of working as follows. Young investors need construction 
labor (supplied by young workers) to build the capital goods 𝑘௧ that will generate the future 
expected return 𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓(𝑘௧). How do investors pay for the resources they need? They need to 
borrow them. One way to borrow labor is to pay for it using a privately-issued IOU entitling 
the bearer to a specific quantity of future output. The type of debt instrument I have in mind 
here resembles the store coupons issued by Canadian Tire (a popular Canadian retailer); see 
Figure 1. The note in Figure 1 promises that it can be redeemed for merchandise at any 
Canadian Tire store. 
Imagine that our young investors operate like Canadian Tire and that our young workers 
get paid in Canadian Tire coupons. Each coupon promises the bearer 𝑟௧ units of output (store 
merchandise) in the following period. Then, if workers sell 𝑘௧௦ units of their labor for 𝑘௧௦ ≤ 𝑦௧ 
coupons, they get to consume 𝑐௧ାଵ௪ = 𝑟௧𝑘௧௦ in period 𝑡 + 1. Given that workers here have no 
other use for their labor, their optimal choice is to set 𝑘௧௦ = 𝑦௧. 
Figure 1: Canadian Tire Coupon 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 A competitive market simply means that no individual can affect the market-determined terms of 
trade. Individuals are of course free to sell their goods at above or below market prices, but doing so 
would be pointless. In the former case, they’d make no sales. In the latter case, they’d sell just as 
much at higher prices by selling at the prevailing market price. 
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Now consider the problem faced by young investors. Given the market rate of return on 
coupons 𝑟௧, an investor’s expected total return is equal to 𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓(𝑘௧) − 𝑟௧𝑘௧, where 𝑟௧𝑘௧  is 
effectively the principal and interest due on a loan of size 𝑘௧. The profit-maximizing level of 
investment is given by a level of investment demand 𝑘௧ௗ that satisfies the condition 
 
𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓ᇱ(𝑘௧ௗ) = 𝑟௧ (1)
The left-hand-side of (1) represents the expected marginal return to capital and the right-hand-
side represents the marginal cost of borrowing. Condition (1) implicitly defines an investment 
demand function 𝑘௧ௗ = 𝑘ௗ(𝑟௧, 𝑥௧ାଵ)  that is decreasing in 𝑟௧  and increasing in 𝑥௧ାଵ  (the 
parameter indexing investor sentiment over the prospective return to investment). 
Consistency of economic decisions in the aggregate translates here into the equation of 
supply and demand 𝑘௧௦ = 𝑘௧ௗ. This market-clearing condition determines the equilibrium real 
interest rate 𝑟௧. Since 𝑘௧௦ = 𝑦௧ = 𝑘௧ௗ, it follows from condition (1) that the equilibrium real 
rate of interest is equal to 𝑟௧ = 𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓ᇱ(𝑦௧).  The associated equilibrium consumption 
allocations are not central to the analysis below, so I relegate their derivation to the appendix. 
2.2 Government debt  
In what follows, I consider a consolidated monetary/fiscal authority and make no distinction 
between nominal government debt and central bank liabilities. In what follows, I assume a 
fixed stock of nominal debt 𝑀. Assume that 𝑀 is injected into the economy at date 𝑡 = 1 as a 
social security payment to the initial old. Because the debt 𝑀 will end up being used as a 
means of payment, I will use the terms government debt and government money 
interchangeably. 
There are several ways to map 𝑀 into objects we (may potentially see) in reality. First, we 
could think of 𝑀 as representing physical currency that passes from hand-to-hand in a peer-
to-peer (P2P) fashion. Second, we could think of 𝑀  as a central bank digital currency 
(CBDC). Imagine, for example, that individuals are permitted to open money accounts with 
the government or the central bank.12 In this case, instead of P2P transactions involving cash, 
one could make payments from account-to-account by instructing the central bank to make 
the appropriate debit/credit operation on a central ledger. Third, we could imagine 𝑀  as 
private bank digital currency (PBDC). In this configuration, the government delegates the 
responsibility of processing payments to the private bank sector, but retains control over the 
total money supply 𝑀.  This latter institutional arrangement is sometimes referred to as 
“narrow banking” or “100% reserve banking” since the liabilities issued by private banks 
                                                 
12 In fact, in the U.S. people can open electronic accounts with the U.S. Treasury; see 
www.treasurydirect.gov. 
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must be backed fully with government debt.13 Figure 2 depicts the balance sheet of a narrow 
bank. 
 
Figure 2: Narrow Bank 
 
 
 
Let 𝑝௧ denote the price of output at date 𝑡 measured in units of government money. If prices 
are expressed in this form, then we say that government money is a unit of account (UoA). If 
individuals accept government money for payment, then it is also a medium of exchange 
(MoE). Note that the UoA and MoE properties are conceptually distinct: one can imagine 
worlds where government debt is a UoA but not a MoE and vice-versa.14 
I assume that the government chooses the nominal interest rate it is willing to pay on its 
debt (we can think of this choice as “monetary policy”). Let 𝑅௧  denote the gross nominal 
interest rate. I assume further that the interest expense of the debt is financed entirely with tax 
revenue 𝑇௧, so that the government budget constraint in each period is given by 
 
𝑇௧ = (𝑅௧ିଵ − 1)𝑀 (2)
In general, the interest expense can also be financed in whole or in part by issuing new debt. I 
make the simplifying and important assumption that taxes are lump-sum. I also make the 
                                                 
13 “Backed fully” means that private bank money is convertible one-for-one with government money. 
14 In periods of high inflation, merchants have been known to specify prices in units of a stable foreign 
currency, while accepting payment in the domestic currency. In the shadow banking sector, private 
securities are used as exchange media with their values expressed in units of currency. 
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simplifying (and not so important) assumption that the lump-sum tax falls entirely on old 
savers. 
A young worker wants to sell his goods 𝑦௧ for purchasing power that he can carry into the 
future. This purchasing power can take the form of government money, which can be spent on 
the goods supplied by future young workers 𝑦௧ାଵ. It can also take the form of direct claims–
like the Canadian Tire coupons described above–claims against the output produced by old 
investors 𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓(𝑘௧). 
If a young workers sells 𝑞௧  units of goods for government money, he earns 𝑚௧ = 𝑝௧𝑞௧ 
dollars. These dollars are debited from the accounts of the buyers and credited to the accounts 
of the sellers in the narrow banking system I described above. Note that since old workers are 
in possession of the entire money supply, these latter exchanges involve transactions between 
young and old workers. If a young worker sells 𝑘௧ units of goods for coupons, the nominal 
value of this coupon revenue is 𝑝௧𝑘௧. Note that 𝑝௧𝑘௧ is only measured in dollars–it does not 
consist of actual dollars (government money). A young worker faces the budget constraint: 
 
𝑝௧𝑞௧ + 𝑝௧𝑘௧ = 𝑝௧𝑦௧ (3)
That is, the worker faces a simple portfolio choice problem: how much of his 𝑝௧𝑦௧ dollars of 
savings to hold in the form of 𝑝௧𝑞௧ dollars of money and 𝑝௧𝑘௧ dollars of coupons. 
If a saver is to willingly hold both money and coupons, the two securities will have to earn 
the same expected rate of return.15 This no-arbitrage-condition can be expressed as 
 
r୲ = R୲(p୲/p୲ାଵ) (4)
where 𝑟௧  represents the real rate of return on private debt and 𝑅௧(𝑝௧/𝑝௧ାଵ) represents the 
inflation-adjusted return on government debt.16 The nominal rate of return on money is equal 
to 𝑅௧  and is set by policy. Selling 𝑞௧  goods for 𝑝௧𝑞௧  dollars today becomes 𝑅௧𝑝௧𝑞௧  dollars 
tomorrow. Selling 𝑘௧  goods today for 𝑝௧𝑘௧  dollars worth of revenue must (by arbitrage) 
become 𝑅௧𝑝௧𝑘௧  dollars worth of coupons tomorrow. An old worker’s budget constraint is 
therefore given by 𝑝௧ାଵ𝑐௧ାଵ௪ = 𝑅௧𝑝௧ሾ𝑞௧ + 𝑘௧ሿ − 𝑇௧ାଵ = 𝑅௧𝑝௧𝑦௧ − 𝑇௧ାଵ, or 
 
c୲ାଵ୵ = r୲y୲ − τ୲ାଵ (5)
where 𝜏௧ ≡ 𝑇௧/𝑝௧. Because money and coupons earn the same expected rate of return, the 
composition of a saver’s wealth portfolio is indeterminate. The composition of saving 
                                                 
15 Recall that savers are risk-neutral here. 
16 Condition (4) is also sometimes referred to as the Fisher equation. 
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between money and coupons at the aggregate level is, however, determined by monetary 
policy. 
Consider now the young investor, who wishes to acquire resources 𝑘௧. An investor who 
acquires one unit of the good today promises to repay 𝑟௧ units of goods (or the purchasing 
power equivalent) tomorrow. In effect, the investor is selling 𝑝௧𝑘௧ dollars worth of coupons to 
savers, who then expect to sell (or exchange) this (dollar equivalent) value for 𝑅௧𝑝௧𝑘௧/𝑝௧ାଵ 
goods tomorrow. Alternatively, it is as if the investor borrows 𝑝௧𝑘௧ dollars and promises to 
repay 𝑅௧𝑝௧𝑘௧ dollars. Note, however, that the investor is not borrowing dollars–he is issuing 
debt to finance the acquisition of real resources. In any case, the old investor’s budget 
constraint is given by, 
 
c୲ାଵ୧ = x୲ାଵf(k୲) − r୲k୲ (6)
If the investor is unconstrained in his borrowing, he will choose a level of investment that 
equates the marginal benefit of investment to its opportunity cost as before, i.e., investment 
demand 𝑘௧ௗ will satisfy condition (1). 
Let me now describe the monetary policy rule that governs the determination of the policy 
rate 𝑅௧. In what follows, I assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule which threatens 
to raise the nominal interest rate one-for-one with the expected rate of inflation, i.e., 
 
R୲ = R୲∗(p୲ାଵ/p୲) (7)
where 𝑅௧∗ is a policy parameter. I have two reasons for choosing a monetary policy of this 
form. First, it is empirically realistic: central banks do tend to increase their policy rates in the 
face of rising inflation expectations. Second, this particular policy rule renders the monetary 
equilibrium unique and dynamically stable.17 
If we combine the monetary policy rule (7) with the no-arbitrage-condition (4), we derive 
the result 𝑟௧ = 𝑅௧∗. That is, in this (highly stylized) model, the government has direct control 
over the real rate of interest through its choice of 𝑅௧∗. The model has a nice recursive structure 
(see Figure 3): 
1. Monetary policy determines the rule (7) with the choice of 𝑅௧∗ determining the real rate of 
interest 𝑟௧. 
2. Given the interest rate 𝑟௧ and investor sentiment 𝑥௧ାଵ, condition (1) determines the level of 
real capital spending 𝑘௧. 
3. Given 𝑦௧ and 𝑘௧ (the former is exogenous and the latter is determined in step 2), condition 
(3) determines the demand for real money balances 𝑞௧ = 𝑦௧ − 𝑘௧. 
                                                 
17 I discuss this in more detail in Andolfatto (2015). 
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Figure 3: Model Structure 
4. With 𝑞௧ so determined, the equilibrium price-level must satisfy 𝑀 = 𝑝௧𝑞௧ (money supply 
= money demand) or 𝑝௧ = 𝑀/𝑞௧. 
The equilibrium consumption allocation can be determined by combining the restrictions 
above with the individual budget constraints. The real GDP at date 𝑡  can similarly be 
determined: 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃௧ = 𝑦௧ + 𝑥௧𝑓(𝑘௧ିଵ). 
Let me discuss the determination of the price-level in a little more detail. In this model 
economy, a young worker’s labor produces output that may take the form of either consumer 
goods or investment goods. Remember that young workers freely accept both government 
money and private coupons as payment for services rendered. Because the old workers pay in 
government money (or, recall, with the liabilities of a 100% reserve bank), young workers 
deliver consumer goods in exchange for government money and deliver investment goods in 
exchange for private coupons. In the aggregate, the quantity of consumer goods delivered to 
old workers must equal 𝑞௧ (step 3 above). Since old workers have a marginal propensity to 
consume equal to one, they spend their entire financial wealth (both money and coupons). 
The quantity of money sold is 𝑀. The quantity of goods purchased for that money is 𝑞௧. The 
exchange rate (price-level) is therefore given by 𝑝௧ = 𝑀/𝑞௧. 
As before, I relegate the determination of the consumption allocation to the appendix. The 
properties of the model resemble those of the textbook model with an IS curve and a policy-
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determined real interest rate. While the real GDP in this model is fixed at 𝑦௧ + 𝑥௧𝑓(𝑘௧ିଵ) as 
of date 𝑡, interest rate policy influences the level of investment 𝑘௧  and hence the level of 
future real GDP.18 The determination of the price-level is very much in the spirit of the 
Quantity Theory of Money. Lump-sum injections of money are generically non-neutral in 
OLG models because individuals have different propensities to consume. Money is 
generically not superneutral as well.19 The appendix contains a more detailed description of 
the model’s properties. 
3    Credit constraints and banking 
If the financial market that links savers and borrowers worked seamlessly in the manner 
modeled above, then the services of a financial intermediary (like a bank) would be 
superfluous. The financial market modeled above works well because I have assumed an 
absence of financial market frictions, in particular: (i) free communication channels between 
savers and borrowers; (ii) full commitment on the part of debtors; and (iii) the absence of 
private information. To the extent that banks are designed to overcome such obstacles, one 
would expect banking arrangements to emerge to help solve these problems. 
The problem from the perspective of young investors is that savers may be sceptical about 
the promises investors make. This is perhaps not surprising, given that promises (e.g., the 
coupons above) are made "out of thin air" and hence, exceptionally easy to fabricate. 
Investors claiming to have profitable investment opportunities may misrepresent prospective 
returns. They may not honor their promises to repay their creditors in a timely manner, or 
even at all. One way to model these considerations is to suppose that investors face a credit 
constraint that limits the amount of debt they are permitted to accumulate to a level less than 
what they could, in principle, repay. For example, suppose that the interest and principal 
repayment that savers expect to secure is determined by a "trust" parameter 𝜃௧ so that, 
 
r୲k୲ ≤ θ୲ (8)
                                                 
18 One might object that since contemporaneous output is predetermined, the model presented here does 
not permit output to be “demand determined.” I should like to point out a few things. First, note that 
there is nothing in my setup which guarantees that the equilibrium is socially optimal. There is a 
sense in which (say) construction labor can be underemployed if business sentiment is unduly 
negative, for example. Second, one could, with a little more effort, endogenize the labor market 
along the lines of Kocherlakota (2012) to model output that is "demand determined." Whether such 
an extension alters the conclusions that follow remains an open question, but my prior is that it does 
not. 
19 Money is only superneutral if the interest on money is financed entirely through money creation. 
ANDOLFATTO     Orthodox and Heterodox Views on Money and Banking 
 
 363
Investment demand is now by given by (1) if the debt constraint (8) is slack, or by 𝑘௧ = 𝜃௧/𝑟௧ 
if the debt constraint (8) binds.20 
Let us suppose that the debt constraint (8) binds. Then the equilibrium level of investment 
is given by 𝑘௧ = 𝜃௧/𝑟௧  so that the marginal return to capital spending is higher than its 
opportunity cost, i.e., 𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓ᇱ(𝜃௧/𝑟௧) > 𝑟௧. The equilibrium level of investment is now lower 
than before, which implies that the equilibrium demand for real money balances is higher. It 
follows that the price-level in this debt-constrained economy is lower than what would prevail 
in an economy where investors are not debt-constrained. Exogenous variation in creditor 
sentiment 𝜃௧ would in this case generate a business cycle with a procyclical price-level. 
Let 𝜃௧௕ denote the "trust" parameter associated with a bank. The assumption that makes 
banks essential in this model is 𝜃௧௕ > 𝜃௧. That is, suppose that bank debt is more marketable 
than private debt. There are a variety of reasons for why this may be the case, especially for 
some segments of the market. For example, bank loan officers are specialists in assessing 
which small business proposals make sense. Relative to the small investor, banks may also 
have better access to specialized lawyers, making it easier to write and enforce legal claims 
against collateralized debt. If this is the case, then there are potentially some gains to trade 
between banks and investors. In particular, banks could offer to buy investor coupons in 
exchange for newly-created banknotes. Or, equivalently, banks could lend investors an 
amount of electronic deposit liabilities against collateral in the form of investor coupons. The 
bank is, in effect, transforming illiquid private debt into a liquid payment instrument. 
Note that banks do not require reserves to perform the liquidity transformation described 
above. To put things another way, banks do not “lend out reserves.” But if this is the case, 
then where do banks get the money to lend? They create the money they need. As is the case 
with all promises, they are created ex nihilo. It’s just that some promises are more credible 
than others.21 
Let’s consider the following scenario. Imagine that it is prohibitively costly to market 
private debt. 22  That is, assume 𝜃௧ = 0  for private debt, so that 𝑘௧ = 0  (investment shuts 
down) in an economy where investors can only finance capital spending through bond-
                                                 
20 Note that it would be easy to generalize the model by assuming that 𝜃 is distributed in some manner 
across the population of investors. In this case, a set of investors would be unconstrained. The set of 
investors who are constrained would receive funding in proportion to their specific 𝜃. 
21 There is the question of what prevents banks from issuing unlimited quantities of money. In the 
model here, the over-issuance of bank money would serve to dilute the purchasing power of bank 
money. In a model that included bank capital, this loss of purchasing power would be absorbed by 
shareholders. Finally, in reality, bank money is made redeemable at par for reserves. Excessive bank 
money creation would ultimately lead individuals to convert their bank deposits into cash. 
22 To evaluate the realism of this assumption, try buying your next cup of coffee with a personal IOU. 
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finance.23 Now, imagine that a banks appear on the scene and that banks are fully credible 
(𝜃௧௕ = ∞). Young investors now turn to banks, who are willing to lend each investor 𝑝௧𝑘௧ 
dollars worth of deposits, where 𝑘௧ satisfies (1). Investors can now pay workers with bank 
money. Investors also agree to repay the loan with interest, 𝑅௧𝑝௧𝑘௧. Of course, to acquire the 
money to make good on their bank loan, investors need to sell some of their future output 
𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓(𝑘௧) to those in possession of money (in this model, the old workers). 
In this way, banks expand the money supply by the level of their lending so that the total 
money supply (as measured at the end of each period) is given by 𝑀1௧ = 𝑀 + 𝑝௧𝑘௧, where 𝑘௧ 
satisfies condition (1). 24 The banking sector’s end-of-period balance sheet is transformed 
from Figure 2 to Figure 4. 
What determines the price-level in this economy where part of the money supply is now 
created by banks through the act of lending? On the one hand, we have the total money 
supply 𝑀1௧. On the other hand, the total nominal demand for money is now given by 𝑝௧𝑦௧. 
That is, when young workers look into their bank accounts, they see 𝑝௧𝑦௧ dollars sitting there 
after selling their goods to old workers and young investors. The market-clearing condition is 
therefore given by, 
 
M1୲ = p୲y୲ (9)
This latter condition can be restated as 𝑀 + 𝑝௧𝑘௧ = 𝑝௧𝑞௧ + 𝑝௧𝑘௧  or, more simply, as 𝑀 =
𝑝௧𝑞௧. But this is exactly the same market-clearing condition we derived earlier for the narrow 
bank economy. Hence banking, in this model at least, only has consequences for the price-
level to the extent it influences the demand for government money. 
To drive this latter point home, note the price-level in the frictionless credit-market 
economy is the same as it is in the fractional reserve banking economy (that overcomes all 
credit frictions). An econometrician studying these two economies sharing the same 𝑘௧ would 
measure the money supply to be 𝑀 in the former economy and 𝑀1௧ > 𝑀 in the latter. How is 
it possible that a larger (measured) money supply is not associated with a higher price-level? I 
can think of two ways of answering this question. First, the econometrician is mismeasuring 
the true money supply in the frictionless credit-market economy, since private debt is in effect 
a form of money (a close money substitute, at least). Second, if one insists on restricting the 
                                                 
23 More realistically, we can imagine that this is true for a subset of the population. 
24 To this total one could add the stock of bank loans created in the previous period 𝑝௧ିଵ𝑘௧ିଵ that is 
now being used by old workers to purchase goods from old investors. But as old investors collect 
this revenue, they use it to pay back their bank loans. By the end of the period, this old stock of bank 
money is “destroyed” as loans are repaid. Repaid bank loans are excluded as part of the date 𝑡 money 
supply. 
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definition of money to bank deposits, then the increase in the supply of deposit money is 
matched here with an increase in the demand for deposit money. 
       Figure 4: Fractional Reserve Bank 
 
 
 
Let us now compare the price-level in the fractional reserve banking economy (that 
overcomes all credit frictions) with the price-level in the narrow bank economy without a 
credit-market. In the former economy, the demand for real government money balances 
satisfies 0 < 𝑞௧ < 𝑦௧. In the latter economy, the demand for real government money balances 
is given by 𝑞௧ = 𝑦௧. Hence, the price-level 𝑝௧ = 𝑀/𝑞௧ is higher in the fractional reserve bank 
economy. In this case, the econometrician sees a positive correlation between the price-level 
and broad money supply (M1). While it would be natural to conclude that the higher price-
level was caused by a larger money supply created by banks in the act of lending, the 
direction of causality does not run from M1୲ to p୲. 
The direction of causality is as follows. An expansion in bank lending (say, brought about 
by an increase in θ୲ୠ) permits an expansion in capital investment, the effect of which is to 
draw savings away from government debt through a portfolio substitution effect. For a given 
interest rate, this implies a decline in the demand for government money. Since the supply of 
government money remains unaffected, the price-level must increase to equate the supply and 
demand for government money. The additional money created by the banking sector is 
incidental to this process (the exact same thing happens for an increase in θ୲). 
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4    Conclusion 
Both mainstream and heterodox theories claim that the business cycle is largely attributable to 
variation in “aggregate demand.” Both theories accept the central role of debt and the 
desirability of stabilization policies. While the mainstream view accepts the fact that banks 
create money, the heterodox view emphasizes it. According to the former, bank lending only 
adds to aggregate demand to the extent it is accommodated by the central bank. According to 
the latter, this is largely the case but even if it was not, bank lending would still have 
considerable latitude to influence the money supply and hence, aggregate demand. 
The model developed above supports the heterodox view if banks are better than financial 
markets in the business of relaxing debt constraints. Given the coexistence of bank and non-
bank financing, it is not likely that banks have a universal comparative advantage in this 
regard. But even if one accepts the heterodox proposition, it’s not clear what the implications 
are for monetary policy. If financial stability is a concern, then a monetary authority must 
monitor economy-wide leverage, and not just the leverage emanating from the banking 
sector.25 
5    Appendix 
5.1    Consumption allocation for loanable funds model 
Since young workers only value future consumption, they save their entire income 𝑦௧. The 
only outlet for their saving here is in the form of capital investment, which is desired by 
investors. Young workers lend their resources to young investors who promise to repay 𝑟௧𝑦௧ 
in the future, where 𝑟௧ is the gross real rate of interest. Thus, workers consume 𝑟௧𝑦௧ in the 
second period of their life and investors consume 𝑥௧ାଵ𝑓(𝑦௧) − 𝑟௧𝑦௧ in the second period of 
their life. 
Since we know the equilibrium interest rate and level of investment, we can characterize 
the equilibrium level of consumption for each of the four types of individuals at a given date 
𝑡 > 1, 
c୲୵ = x୲αf(y୲ିଵ)
c୲ାଵ୵ = x୲ାଵαf(y୲)
c୲୧ = (1 − α)x୲f(y୲ିଵ)
c୲ାଵ୧ = (1 − α)x୲ାଵf(y୲)
 
                                                 
25 It should go without saying (but obviously does not) that I do not consider this paper to constitute the 
final word on the matter. What I hope to have established is a framework that can help organize our 
thinking on the matter. The purpose of the mathematical model is to help make explicit the 
assumptions driving various conclusions. This explicitness is meant to invite constructive criticism 
and avoid semantic debates. 
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where the expressions above make use of the fact that 𝛼𝑓(𝑘) = 𝑓ᇱ(𝑘)𝑘. The consumption 
allocations (𝑐௧௪, 𝑐௧௜)  can be thought of as measuring ex post (realized) utility while the 
allocation (𝑐௧ାଵ௪ , 𝑐௧ାଵ௜ ) can be thought of as measuring ex ante (expected) utility. Suppose, for 
example, that {𝑥௧} follows a stochastic process. Then an increase/decrease in 𝑥௧ାଵ  can be 
interpreted as a bullish/bearish change in sentiment. The actual realization may, of course, 
differ from what is expected. 
 
5.2    Consumption allocation for model with government debt 
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium with government debt, combine (6) with 
(1) and the fact that 𝑓ᇱ(𝑘)𝑘 = 𝛼𝑓(𝑘) to derive, 
 
c୲ାଵ୧ = (1 − α)x୲ାଵf(k୲) (10)
and 
 c୲୧ = (1 − α)x୲f(k୲ିଵ) (11)
Next, update the government budget constraint (2) by one period and divide both sides by 
𝑝௧ାଵ  to form 𝜏௧ାଵ = (𝑅௧ − 1)(𝑀/𝑝௧ାଵ)  or 𝜏௧ାଵ = (𝑅௧ − 1)(𝑝௧/𝑝௧ାଵ)(𝑀/𝑝௧).  Using the 
market-clearing condition 𝑀 = 𝑝௧𝑞௧, this latter expression becomes 𝜏௧ାଵ = (𝑟௧ − 𝑝௧/𝑝௧ାଵ)𝑞௧ 
which, when combined with (5) becomes 𝑐௧ାଵ௪ = 𝑟௧𝑦௧ − (𝑟௧ − 𝑝௧/𝑝௧ାଵ)𝑞௧, or 
 
c୲ାଵ୵ = r୲k୲ + (p୲/p୲ାଵ)q୲ (12)
and 
 c୲୵ = r୲ିଵk୲ିଵ + (p୲ିଵ/p୲)q୲ିଵ (13)
using the fact that 𝑦௧ = 𝑞௧ + 𝑘௧.  This payoff structure across old workers and investors 
obviously depends on who bears the tax needed to finance the interest expense of the public 
debt. In the setup here, I have assumed that old workers pay the requisite tax, but given the 
linearity of preferences and the lump-sum nature of taxes, nothing important (apart from 
distributional consequences) hinges on who bears the incidence of the tax. 
5.3    Properties of the model 
In what follows, I describe some of the properties of the model when the economy is shocked 
in some manner (i.e., when a model parameter changes unexpectedly). I assume that the 
shocks are unexpected and transitory (so people are surprised, but they view the shock as a 
one-off event). 
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1. An increase in the interest rate 𝑅௧∗  (tighter monetary policy) leads to a decrease in 
investment and a decline in the price-level. A higher real rate of interest contracts 
investment demand, inducing young workers to divert their savings to government 
money. The consequent increase in demand for real money balances is deflationary 
(individuals are willing to sell goods at lower prices in order to acquire the money they 
want). The surprise deflation increases welfare for old workers (13), who are in 
possession of the nominal debt when the interest rate is raised.26 The change in welfare 
for young workers (12) is ambiguous. The welfare of old investors (11) is unaffected. The 
welfare of young investors (10) decreases, since their borrowing costs have risen. 
2. A decrease in 𝑦௧  (temporary negative supply shock) implies a contraction in desired 
saving. The temporary shortfall in saving is absorbed entirely by a decrease in the 
demand for real money balances–the level of investment (which hinges on the 
expectation of future economic conditions) remains unaffected. A decline in the demand 
for real money balances is inflationary. The surprise inflation decreases welfare for old 
workers (13), who are in possession of the money supply when the interest rate is raised. 
The change in welfare for young workers (12) is ambiguous. The welfare of young and 
old investors (11) is unaffected. 
3. A decrease in 𝑥௧ାଵ (bad news shock) leads to decline in investment, since the expected 
return to investment is now lower. Savers substitute of out private sector financial 
instruments into government debt. The resulting increase in the demand for government 
money is deflationary–the price-level declines. The surprise deflation increases welfare 
for old workers (13), who are in possession of the money supply when the interest rate is 
raised. The change in welfare for young workers (12) is ambiguous. The welfare of old 
investors (11) is unaffected. The welfare of young investors (10) decreases, since the 
return to their investments is now expected to be lower. 
If we shut down all time variation in the model parameters {𝑅௧∗, 𝑦௧, 𝑥௧ାଵ}, then the economy 
settles into a steady-state equilibrium with 𝑟∗ = 𝑅∗ = 𝑅 = 𝑥𝑓ᇱ(𝑘∗)  and 𝑞∗ = 𝑦 − 𝑘∗.  The 
equilibrium price-level is then given by the market-clearing condition 𝑝∗ = 𝑀/𝑞∗.  The 
equilibrium rate of inflation is zero. 
The transitory shocks considered above generate surprise changes in the price-level, but no 
change in the path of future price-levels. There is the question of how to properly label a one-
time shock to the price-level. If 𝑝௧  denotes the initial equilibrium price-level and 𝑝௧ᇱ < 𝑝௧ 
denotes the post-shock equilibrium price-level, then 𝑝௧ᇱ/𝑝௧ < 1 could properly be thought of 
as a transitory deflation even if theorists tend to label this a “price-level jump.” Note that this 
price-level jump down portends an increase in the expected rate of inflation since (𝑝௧ାଵ/
                                                 
26 If I had modeled debt with different maturities, a surprise increase in the interest rate would result in 
capital losses on long-maturity debt. 
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𝑝௧) > (𝑝௧ାଵ/𝑝௧ᇱ).  This is simply a property of mean-reverting processes. Consider, for 
example, a transitory decline in 𝑦௧. If 𝑦௧ାଵ remains unaffected, then the recession induced by 
the decline in 𝑦௧ implies an increase in the expected rate of economic growth. 
Note that the Taylor rule (7) has implications for how the nominal interest rate reacts to 
the shocks considered above. Remember that our specification of the Taylor rule assumes that 
the monetary authority increases the policy rate one-for-one with the expected rate of 
inflation. So, in the first experiment above, a decline in 𝑅௧∗ obviously calls for a cut in the 
policy rate 𝑅௧. However, the resulting decline in the price-level leads to an increase in the 
expected rate of inflation, which means that the policy rate rises by more than 𝑅௧∗. In the 
second experiment, the decline in 𝑦௧ leads to an increase in the price-level, which implies a 
reduction in the expected rate of inflation. In this case, the monetary authority lowers its 
policy rate. 27 Finally, in the third experiment above, the negative news shock leads to a 
decline in the price-level and an increase in the expected rate of inflation. The policy rule here 
implies that the policy rate is increased. This is not, of course, a description of optimal 
monetary policy. I am only describing what is implied by a policy that operates according to a 
rule like (7). 
There are ways to use the model to think about the appropriate conduct of monetary 
actions on an ad hoc basis (which is basically how policy works in the real world anyway). 
Suppose for example that a decline in 𝑥௧ାଵ is the product of a growing irrational pessimism (a 
brooding animal spirit). The policy rule (7) keeps the real rate of interest stable. The 
implication is a large decline in capital spending, a flight-to-quality (government debt) and a 
transitory deflation. There would be some rationale, in this case, for the central bank to lower 
𝑅௧∗ in its policy rule–the effect of which would be to temporarily lower the policy rate to keep 
investment demand stable. If the pessimistic outlook over the return to capital spending turns 
out to be wrong (inconsistent with fundamentals), then investors will be glad that the central 
bank intervened the way it did when it did. Of course, policy mistakes are also possible. 
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